MELBOURNE — The third India-Australia Annual Summit on July 9 produced 18 outcomes spanning defense, energy, critical minerals, technology, and education. Yet the most consequential deliverable was the finalization of administrative arrangements for Australian uranium exports to India, ending a 12-year impasse under a civil nuclear agreement signed in 2014.
The summit also saw a renewed defense and security declaration replacing the 2009 version, alongside new commitments on shipbuilding, maritime security, and cyber cooperation. But notably absent was progress on the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), launched in 2011, suspended in 2016, relaunched in 2021, and repeatedly promised at successive summits since 2023. It remains unsigned.
A Partnership of Two Speeds
Since the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was established in 2020, the security dimension of the relationship has yielded concrete outcomes at every major meeting. Australia hosted Exercise Malabar for the first time in 2023, and the 2026 summit operationalized the uranium deal and updated the defense declaration. The Critical Minerals Corridor, launched to secure supply chains for lithium, cobalt, and rare earths, was framed as a strategic security measure rather than a standard trade mechanism, though it remains at the framework stage.
In contrast, the economic side has produced only one interim deal: the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), signed in April 2022. ECTA covered goods tariffs and included limited services and mobility commitments but deferred the hardest issues for CECA, including investment, government procurement, and broader labor mobility.
Two-way trade has more than doubled since 2020, reaching approximately US$33 billion in 2025, making India Australia’s fifth-largest trading partner. Yet the figures remain modest compared to the four partners above it, and Australia has concluded comprehensive trade agreements with all of them. The deal with South Korea took five years, Japan’s seven, China’s 10, Indonesia’s nine, and the EU agreement eight. India, at 15 years and counting, is the outlier.
ECTA has driven much of the growth, with agricultural exports more than doubling since it came into force. But the gains have come from goods liberalization. The services, investment, and mobility provisions that would give the relationship economic depth remain unresolved.
Uranium Deal Reflects Strategic Shift
The uranium deal underscores a broader strategic alignment. Australia exports uranium to more than 40 countries under established frameworks, but India, as a nuclear-armed state outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, required more complex safeguards. The civil nuclear agreement sat unused for nearly 12 years because the two sides could not agree on tracking and reporting uranium transfers. India’s foreign secretary said resolving the impasse required “very intense discussions” over two years. Only a single test shipment in 2017 had moved between the two countries before 2026.
Much like the Critical Minerals Corridor, the uranium deal cleared because both governments treated it as a security priority. India aims to expand its nuclear capacity from roughly 8 gigawatts (GW) to 100 GW by 2047, while Australia seeks to demonstrate its value as a reliable Indo-Pacific partner and diversify its export relationships. When the strategic logic on both sides pointed in the same direction, procedural obstacles gave way.
Trade Deal Stalls on Dairy and Wine
The trade deal faces a different kind of obstacle. India is the world’s largest milk producer, and the dairy lobby is powerful enough to have helped push India out of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in 2019. The Gujarat Milk Marketing Federation, headquartered in Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home state, was among the first to welcome that withdrawal. As of 2025, dairy and wine tariffs were the main sticking points, with a senior Indian official ruling out further concessions on either.
On the Australian side, the services and mobility provisions India most wants—particularly easier access for IT workers and recognition of professional qualifications—run into politically sensitive workforce and migration debates. The interim deal was designed as a stepping stone, but by deferring the hardest issues, it left the core obstacles unresolved. CECA negotiations have continued, with more than 10 formal rounds completed, but neither side has signaled a timeline for conclusion.
The underlying problem is that neither government pays a real political price for leaving the CECA unresolved. The trade relationship matters but is not large enough to force action. By comparison, Australia and China’s approximately $212 billion in two-way trade created pressure to manage the relationship even at its most strained. India’s broader trade posture has been one of “sustained disengagement,” where domestic protectionist interests consistently override outward-looking economic ambitions.
When the politics do align, India can move fast: the trade deal with the UAE was concluded in 88 days. India signed a comprehensive deal with the UK in July 2025, three and a half years after launching negotiations, covering services, mobility, and government procurement. It concluded negotiations with the EU in January 2026, the largest trade deal either side had attempted, after more than three years of active talks. Both involved difficult agricultural and services concessions. The CECA’s 15-year timeline stands out against that record.
This matters because a partnership built primarily on a shared reading of regional threats is only as durable as that shared reading. The Quad, which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, has deepened security cooperation, but economic ties remain shallow. As India-Japan strategic convergence reshapes Indo-Pacific power dynamics, the Australia-India relationship risks being defined by security alone, leaving trade as a persistent weak link.
