At a symposium in England last week, European and other international participants spent much of their time denouncing Donald Trump, the United States, and Americans as unreliable and unpredictable. A friend visiting Australia reported being asked almost immediately: "So, what do you think about America not being dependable anymore?"
But here is the message for Europe, Australia, and others: outside a small circle in Washington and the foreign policy establishment, almost no one in the United States is losing sleep over being called undependable. That is especially true when "dependable" means sending American young men and women to fight and die for allies who neglect their own defense—or who refuse to lift a finger when help is needed, as in the ongoing confrontation with Iran.
Absolute predictability, even in alliances, is not always a virtue. It breeds complacency and makes you easy to outmaneuver. If the weaker side in a relationship assumes the stronger will fight for them no matter what, they may do as little as possible—as post-Cold War Europe has demonstrated.
Trump was not the first US president to press NATO allies to spend more. His predecessors made the same request and were largely ignored. So Trump resorted to blunt language—Queens, New York English—and hurt some feelings. But the underlying complaint was legitimate.
Australia, for instance, has a professional but small military, starved of funds and strategic direction. Canberra seems reluctant to change that, and buying a few expensive nuclear submarines from the US will not solve the problem. Perhaps the US was too predictable for too long.
Japan offers a more constructive example. For decades, Tokyo calculated the minimum defense effort it could get away with under the US security umbrella—and then did a little less. But now Japan has awakened. It recognizes that the more it bolsters its own defenses—money, hardware, manpower—the more dependable the Americans become. As the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's defense study group noted earlier this year: "No country will come to the aid of a nation that is not prepared to defend itself. Japan, too, must clearly demonstrate its national resolve to defend itself and show the determination and resolve to serve as a standard-bearer for peace and security in the region."
Get the ambassadors out of Washington
Insulting Americans may feel cathartic, but it is counterproductive. If foreign elites keep telling Americans they are undependable, they may eventually become just that—unwilling to help. European, Australian, and other ambassadors should leave Washington and visit the Rotary Clubs and PTAs in Youngstown, Ohio, and Hutchinson, Kansas. They should make their case there and try out the "undependable" and "untrustworthy" lines, if they dare. But more importantly, they should listen.
Foreign elites' understanding of Americans often comes from the American press, the European press regurgitating it, and the American elite establishment—much of which is firmly anti-Trump. That is fine, but Trump Derangement Syndrome (TDS) means that "Trump is stupid" is the starting point. Hence the open laughter when Trump warned Germans about relying on Russian energy in 2018, or when Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio spoke about Europe's declining freedoms in 2024-25. The American academic establishment, supposedly more objective, is often afflicted with the same condition.
Some foreign elites think they can simply wait out Trump and return to normal. But Trump taps into a broader vein of American isolationism—a desire to be left alone and avoid far-away fights—that has existed since the late 19th century. And if the Democratic Socialists of America gain influence, they may also support a more restrained foreign policy. Then what will Europeans, Australians, and others do? Some on the left and Green political class might not mind. Russia and China certainly won't mind, but for different reasons—they will smell opportunity.
Ultimately, this is not complicated. As my friend in Australia put it: "At the end of the day, I am not sure we are the unpredictable, undependable ones. We will fight and we will fight for others no doubt—but not on their behalf when they don't have real skin in the game."
When the Royal Navy takes a week to send its one available destroyer toward Cyprus after Iranian drones hit a British base, and the Australian Navy has only about 11 surface combatants to cover a vast Indo-Pacific, that is not skin in the game. Allies need to step up, not just complain. For more on how allies can better manage their own security, see Australia's experience resisting economic coercion and China's calculus as the global order frays.
