Early Sunday morning in Seoul, two steel arms in Texas caught a spacecraft that had just completed 14 orbits of Earth—a striking demonstration of human ingenuity. The previous day, the booster had failed to return to the pad, but the upper stage still made it home. This week brings another test of ambition: Anthropic, maker of the Claude AI model, is preparing to list on Nasdaq, with investor orders reportedly oversubscribed by six times. Its scientific advances are equally notable: Claude improved a partial result related to the Riemann hypothesis, one of mathematics' Millennium Prize Problems, while a model from rival OpenAI disproved a long-standing conjecture tied to Paul Erdős's unit-distance problem.
Both feats took place in the United States, my adopted country. They illustrate the promise of a society that attracts talent and capital from around the world and gives competing teams the freedom to pursue ideas with uncertain payoffs. In a recent essay, I argued that South Korea gains security by becoming a technological partner that many countries depend on. The United States has even more to lose if it treats cross-border commerce and talent as presumptive threats.
The cost of closing doors
The economic benefits of openness are measurable. Research by Daron Acemoglu and coauthors finds that greater civil liberty raises long-run GDP. A separate study of American inventors found that immigrants accounted for 16% of inventors and 23% of patents, with benefits extending to their US-born collaborators. Yet the Trump administration extended a $100,000 payment requirement for covered H-1B petitions involving workers abroad, subject to exemptions. That raises the price of recruiting the people on whom American science and industry depend.
Political theorist Daniel A. Bell's case for political meritocracy takes seriously the susceptibility of electoral democracy to demagoguery and short-term thinking. The Trump administration's war with Iran and its successive tariff campaigns show how much latitude a president has to impose his priorities. Yet citizens still have elections, an independent press, and courts through which to contest those decisions.
China's leaders also reverse course. Beijing abandoned much of its zero-Covid policy after widespread protests in 2022. But Chinese citizens have no competitive national election through which to replace the leaders responsible. China's industrial policies have built formidable manufacturing capacity, even as IMF researchers find that subsidies encourage excess production in favored sectors and reduce aggregate productivity. Open criticism and independent review give officials more ways to discover such costs before they mount.
The chip control debate
Democrats and Republicans in Congress are also seeking to add tighter chip controls to the annual defense bill. Their proposals predate Jensen Huang's resignation, but the controversy has given them momentum. Huang acknowledged an affair. Public reporting has yet to establish that the woman involved was a Chinese intelligence asset or that the relationship compromised US technology. The Washington Post reported that Secretary of State Marco Rubio used more assertive language than the CIA's reporting when he summarized it. Congress should ask what the underlying intelligence supports, what uncertainties the memo conveyed, and who bears responsibility if officials presented conjecture as established fact.
There is a case for investigating possible chip diversion and enforcing existing controls. Any new restriction deserves its own evidentiary case. Lawmakers should wait for the findings before using the Huang affair to justify a policy shift. They should identify the specific military or intelligence risk each restriction addresses, show how the measure would reduce it, and consider whether it would divert sales to competitors or accelerate Chinese substitution. A rule aimed at a verified diversion network has a clearer purpose than a sweeping ban on commercially available chips. The wider the proposed restriction, the stronger the evidence Congress should demand.
Individual liberty, including the freedom to work, trade, and invest, is the starting presumption of a liberal democracy. When credible evidence establishes a national-security threat, government should act in proportion to it. The burden of making that case belongs to those asking Americans to surrender freedoms that underpin their country's ingenuity.
The benefits of American openness extend beyond its borders. Technologies developed in the United States, including AI, help people around the world learn, conduct research, and examine competing ideas. Their contribution to global liberty depends on broad access and the opportunity to question governments, including America's. Preserving an open American economy serves both national security and the freedom of people everywhere to discover, create, and disagree.
As the region watches, the choices made in Washington will shape not only American competitiveness but also the broader Indo-Pacific balance. For a deeper look at how AI politics are shifting globally, see Nvidia's leadership crisis. And for a perspective on how energy, not AI, may be America's real leverage, read this analysis.


