In an emerging multipolar order, the United States appears less focused on dominating every frontier technology than on wielding influence over the world's most finite and strategically vital commodities: oil and gas. Control, disruption, or the credible threat of disruption to global energy supplies has become Washington's principal instrument for preserving dollar primacy, sustaining demand for US Treasury securities, and maintaining a semblance of hegemony.
This is not to suggest that every American administration follows an identical playbook. But across recent presidencies, a consistent pattern emerges: energy security, energy market influence, and the geopolitical leverage that flows from both remain central to US strategy.
Energy as strategic leverage
Venezuela illustrates the first approach: direct control. Following Washington's removal of Nicolás Maduro and its intervention in Venezuelan oil exports, the United States secured access to a substantial share of the country's hydrocarbon wealth. President Donald Trump has claimed the arrangement would ultimately give the US control over more than 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. That figure should be treated cautiously. Venezuela's officially reported 303 billion barrels are widely viewed as inflated; independent experts cited by the Associated Press put realistic recoverable proven reserves closer to 60–120 billion barrels. Even at the lower estimate, Venezuela represents an unusually large resource base in the Western Hemisphere—and one that Washington can now influence directly.
Iran and the wider Gulf represent a second method: disruption. The US-Israel war on Iran, launched in late February 2026, effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global energy supplies once flowed. Middle Eastern producers cut or rerouted exports, shipping costs surged, and Brent crude nearly doubled in the first two months of the conflict, peaking at $118 per barrel in March.
For Washington, outright victory over Iran may not be the objective. Persistent instability in the Gulf raises the global price of energy, strengthens the relative position of US producers and LNG exporters, and reinforces the perception of US-controlled supply routes as indispensable. This dynamic also serves broader financial interests: when oil and gas become scarce or insecure, inflationary pressure rises, risk assets come under strain, and investors often seek safety in US dollar assets, particularly long-dated Treasuries. A crisis that weakens alternatives to the dollar, depresses gold and other perceived safe-haven assets, and pushes capital toward US government debt simultaneously supports dollar hegemony and lowers the political cost of American fiscal deficits.
The benefits are not evenly distributed. US oil and gas producers and exporters gain from higher global prices, while energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia absorb a heavier burden. US consumers are not immune: gasoline rose above $4.60 per gallon in May 2026, and diesel reached a record $6.50 per gallon in September as refining capacity tightened. But relative to import-dependent economies, the United States retains a structural advantage.
Why AI won't replace oil
The contrast with artificial intelligence is central to the argument. AI is transformative, but its supply is potentially replicable. No company or state is likely to monopolize it indefinitely: models diffuse, open-source alternatives emerge, and competitors—including Chinese firms—can narrow capability gaps. Oil and gas are different. They are finite, geographically concentrated, and dependent on pipelines, ports, chokepoints, refineries, and political access. Their value lies not only in their scarcity but in the fact that control over their movement can be contested.
This is why the US may regard energy, rather than AI supremacy, as the more durable foundation of geopolitical power. A technology leader can be overtaken; a state that influences access to the Gulf, Venezuela, or Russian energy flows retains leverage even if its technological edge narrows. The war in Ukraine fits the same framework. The severing of Russian pipeline gas and oil flows to Europe was not simply a consequence of conflict; it accelerated Europe's dependence on US liquefied natural gas (LNG) and other Atlantic-basin supplies. Whatever one's view of responsibility for the war, the energy outcome was unambiguous: Europe dismantled its previous reliance on Russian hydrocarbons, while US fossil-fuel exporters gained market share.
The reported US offer to accept Russian diesel under a waiver should therefore be read less as a major market intervention than as a symbolic demonstration of leverage. Russia has reportedly said the gesture does not materially alter the underlying geopolitical or geoeconomic relationship. Its significance lies in Washington's ability to grant, withhold, or condition access to energy markets, not the volume of diesel involved.
China's energy dilemma
China faces the sharpest version of this problem. As the world's largest energy consumer, it remains heavily dependent on imported oil and gas, especially much of it shipped through maritime routes that pass near contested waters and strategic chokepoints. Beijing's response has been twofold: expand domestic energy production and accelerate electrification. Coal still plays a dominant role, but the push for renewables and electric vehicles is partly a strategic hedge against import vulnerability. Yet even with these efforts, China's reliance on seaborne energy leaves it exposed to disruptions that Washington can influence.
For Asian economies like Japan, South Korea, and India, the implications are equally stark. They import nearly all their oil and gas, and their energy security depends on stable sea lanes and diversified suppliers. The US strategy of leveraging energy leverage thus has direct consequences for the Indo-Pacific, where maritime chokepoints like the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea become flashpoints. As Washington tightens its grip on global energy flows, Asian nations must navigate a delicate balance between US security guarantees and their own energy needs.
In this multipolar landscape, energy is not just a commodity—it is the currency of power. While AI and other technologies capture headlines, the quiet control of oil and gas remains America's most potent weapon. For the rest of the world, especially Asia, the message is clear: energy security is national security, and the ability to withstand energy coercion will define strategic independence in the decades ahead.
