Artificial intelligence may not create a new kind of terrorism, but it makes existing tactics cheaper, faster and easier. That is the central argument of a July 2026 report from the U.S.-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. But a new analysis by a terrorism expert suggests that different militant groups are not thinking about AI in the same way.
Dr. [Name], who studies how militant groups think and adapt, examined propaganda, guides and strategic writings from al-Qaida and the Islamic State (ISIS) to observe how they interpret and adopt new technologies. The research found that affiliates, media outlets and supporters across both movements use AI for propaganda, recruitment, security and planning. But their approaches reflect how each movement fights.
Two different timelines
Al-Qaida is more deliberate and thinks in decades. The Islamic State moves quickly and seeks immediate effect. This difference mirrors each group's organizational culture and reveals a distinct view of time and war. The Islamic State built its project around a caliphate to hold and display now—urgency that rewards whoever produces a visible effect today. Al-Qaida built its project around a generational war of attrition, betting that will and endurance could outlast a technologically superior enemy.
The Islamic State has long been the more aggressive media innovator. At the height of its self-declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq, it built a sophisticated media apparatus prioritizing speed, spectacle and professional production. That instinct has carried into the AI era, aided by younger, digitally immersed supporters who readily experiment with new tools.
Since 2023, Islamic State supporters and affiliates have produced a growing stream of AI-generated content. After the March 2024 Moscow concert hall attack that killed more than 130 people, supporters circulated a bulletin featuring a fake, AI-generated Arabic-speaking anchor who framed the attack as part of the group's wider war. Islamic State-linked networks have also used AI to generate images, speed up translation and produce multilingual propaganda.
In June 2025, the Islamic State's Afghanistan affiliate, Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), published an issue of its English-language magazine, Voice of Khorasan. Released by al-Azaim Foundation, it framed AI literacy as an individual religious duty for every Muslim—placing it in the same legal category that jihadi ideologues often apply to defensive jihad. The article casts AI as a force already shaping war, business and identity, while also warning about deepfakes, surveillance and data collection. The foundation later withdrew the religious label after ridicule from other jihadi groups, but left the guidance in place, suggesting a pattern of rapid adoption followed by doctrinal correction.
Al-Qaida's affiliates and supporters are also experimenting with AI. Pro-al-Qaida outlets circulated likely AI-generated imagery as early as 2023, and its networks have promoted chatbot workshops and guides. In 2024, the al-Qaida-linked Al-Malahem Electronic Army released a guide titled Amazing Ways to Use AI-Powered Chatbots, offering supporters advice on using the technology. In July 2025, the United Nations reported that al-Shabaab, al-Qaida's Somali affiliate, used AI tools to translate its messaging into several languages.
In May 2026, India's National Investigation Agency filed charges over a November 2025 car bombing in Delhi that killed 11 people. Investigators alleged that the cell responsible was associated with al-Qaida in the Indian subcontinent and employed an engineer who used YouTube and ChatGPT to research explosives. Separately, some analysts have suggested that recent drone adaptations by al-Qaida's West African affiliate may involve open-source AI tools, although evidence remains indirect.
Al-Qaida-linked militants have warned that deepfakes could infiltrate or manipulate their online discussions. Their social media channels have also debated using AI for religious research, with some posts arguing that relying on it showed ignorance and weak religious knowledge.
Both movements teach supporters how to use these tools and guard against them. But parts of the pro-al-Qaida media ecosystem ask a different question: Does the technology change the nature of war itself? The clearest example is the pro-al-Qaida Anaziat Foundation, which across six consecutive installments of its Fiqh al-Harb (Jurisprudence of War) series in 2025 published Arabic translations of Western strategic writing on AI, cyberwar and technological change.
This divergence in AI adoption has implications for counterterrorism efforts across the Indo-Pacific, where both groups maintain active networks. As the real AI threat lies in information control, not superintelligence, understanding how these groups operationalize the technology is critical. The Islamic State's approach, focused on immediate propaganda gains, contrasts with al-Qaida's more strategic, long-term thinking—a difference that security agencies from Jakarta to New Delhi must account for.
