While global attention remains fixed on the Strait of Hormuz and the war in Ukraine, a quieter but consequential strategic competition is intensifying in the Bay of Bengal. Both China and India are recalibrating their maritime and connectivity strategies in this increasingly contested waterway, with implications for the broader Indo-Pacific order.
In April, India’s National Maritime Security Strategy 2026 identified the eastern Indian Ocean and Bay of Bengal as emerging arenas of long-term strategic competition. The document stressed that the next phase of maritime rivalry would be defined not only by naval assets but by ports, logistics networks, supply chains, digital connectivity, and sustained competition below the threshold of open conflict.
China’s Eastern Pivot
Beijing is now moving to accelerate the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor, a project that goes beyond a typical Belt and Road Initiative undertaking. It reflects a reassessment of how China secures access to the Indian Ocean as geopolitical conflict, insurgencies, and regional instability destabilize several of its principal overland connectivity routes.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has faced persistent attacks by Baloch rebels on Chinese nationals and infrastructure, compounded by the threat from Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and instability across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Meanwhile, routes through Iran, including the Chabahar-Zahedan corridor and the Middle Corridor, are exposed to heightened risks from the Iran-US conflict, sanctions, and rising insurance costs. As a recent analysis of a potential Hormuz blockade shows, such disruptions can have cascading effects on global supply chains.
It is not that these corridors have ceased to function. Rather, each has become more vulnerable to disruption during crises. For Beijing, the challenge is no longer simply securing access to overseas markets but ensuring assured access when geopolitical conditions deteriorate.
As confidence in western corridors weakens, the strategic premium attached to China’s eastern gateway through Myanmar rises. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor provides landlocked Yunnan province with direct access to the Bay of Bengal via Kyaukphyu, bypassing both the Strait of Malacca and Pakistan. Existing oil and gas pipelines already offer an alternative energy route into southwest China, while planned road and rail links promise to strengthen commercial connectivity. For Beijing, Myanmar is no longer simply another BRI partner; it is becoming an increasingly important pillar of China’s Indian Ocean access strategy.
Bangladesh as a Hedge
Yet Myanmar alone cannot hedge China’s strategic risk. Civil conflict in Rakhine and Shan states continues to complicate infrastructure development and threatens the long-term security of transport routes to Kyaukphyu. Just as insurgency has imposed growing costs on CPEC, Myanmar’s fragmented security environment constrains the predictability of the China-Myanmar corridor.
This is where Bangladesh assumes growing importance. The proposed China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor is an effort to deepen resilience by adding ports, logistics infrastructure, and industrial capacity across the northern Bay of Bengal. Bangladesh’s ports—particularly Chattogram and potentially Mongla—complement rather than replace Myanmar’s maritime facilities. If instability periodically constrains operations in Kyaukphyu, expanded connectivity through Bangladesh provides additional flexibility while broadening China’s economic footprint. However, the fundamental problems in Rakhine still render the corridor vulnerable.
India’s Counter-Moves
India is not standing still. New Delhi’s agreement with Indonesia to develop Sabang Port, located near the northern entrance to the Strait of Malacca, complements its efforts to transform Great Nicobar into a major hub for logistics, surveillance, and maritime operations. Together, these projects strengthen India’s ability to monitor traffic entering and leaving the eastern Indian Ocean.
Indonesia’s expanding defense partnerships with the US, Japan, and Australia further reinforce maritime cooperation and domain awareness around Southeast Asia’s principal sea lanes. None of these arrangements is directed solely at China, but collectively they complicate Beijing’s long-term assumptions about uninterrupted access through Malacca. The deepening of Australia-India security ties adds another layer to this evolving strategic architecture.
For Chinese planners, the logical response is to strengthen the one overland corridor that provides relatively direct access from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal. As the strategic environment around the Strait of Malacca grows more complex, the Bay of Bengal—long regarded as a secondary theater in China’s maritime strategy—has become a central front in the emerging great game between Asia’s two largest powers.
