The Houthi movement's recent seizure of strategic Red Sea positions has transformed the security landscape for African coastal states, with implications that extend far beyond Yemen's borders. The Iran-aligned group now controls the port of Mocha, Mayyun Island, and the Zuqar and Hanish archipelago, areas previously held by Yemeni government forces. These locations sit near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a narrow 32-kilometer chokepoint that links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
Mayyun Island, in particular, divides the shipping lane that carries roughly 12% of global trade. While the Houthis have not taken territory on the African side of the strait, their September 2026 advance has heightened economic and security vulnerabilities for Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. The threat also risks worsening existing conflicts in Somalia and Sudan.
For over two decades, I have studied maritime geopolitics in the Red Sea region. The Houthi threat is not merely logistical; it poses a strategic danger to Africa's Red Sea states. The group's armed presence around the strait brings missiles, mines, and fast-attack craft closer to a critical corridor for international shipping. Iran, meanwhile, retains the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz, raising the specter of simultaneous disruption at two vital maritime chokepoints.
Economic fallout for African nations
The disruption cascades through four channels: shipping and insurance costs, port revenue, energy and food prices, and maritime security risks. Egypt bears the highest direct financial burden. In 2024, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping cost Cairo an estimated US$7 billion in lost Suez Canal revenue. Although revenue reached US$4.67 billion for fiscal year 2025-26, a 23% increase from the previous year, continued diversions could quickly reverse this improvement.
Djibouti, a key conduit for landlocked Ethiopia's trade—about 95% of which passes through its ports—has seen over 3,700 people flee hostilities in western Yemen to its northern shores. Renewed fighting has pushed displacement since early September 2026 to nearly 142,000. Eritrea, with its strategic coastline, is also vulnerable, and its position makes it attractive to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which seek to counter Iranian and Houthi influence on the African side of the Red Sea.
The Houthi crisis compounds existing instability in Somalia and Sudan. Reports indicate that the Houthis and the Somali terror group al-Shabaab have exchanged weapons, drone technology, and training in exchange for facilitating piracy off Somalia's coast. This has contributed to a 10-year high in piracy incidents in 2026, prompting Somalia to approve an anti-piracy bill in September. In Sudan, Iranian support has reached parts of the Sudanese Armed Forces, which is battling the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces. By mid-2024, the Houthis were reportedly helping Iran supply weapons to the Sudanese army, and the US Treasury has sanctioned key Sudanese figures over these ties.
Shifting regional alliances
The geopolitical realignment in the Red Sea predates the Houthi offensive. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum with the breakaway region of Somaliland for access to its Red Sea coast and a naval base, in exchange for a path toward recognition. Somalia, Eritrea, and Egypt opposed the deal and established a joint security mechanism within a year.
Regional security cooperation has accelerated. In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks where 14 countries, including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan, and Somalia, established the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance. Notably, the UAE—following clashes with Saudi-backed forces in Yemen in December 2025—and landlocked Ethiopia are excluded. A competing alignment involving the UAE, Israel, and Ethiopia has emerged, strengthened by Israel's recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. On the other side are Somalia, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
Iran has also sought a military foothold along the Red Sea corridor, including in Sudan. Eritrea, meanwhile, is leveraging its strategic coastline to strengthen its regional position and counterbalance Ethiopia. The result is a growing contest for influence in which Middle Eastern powers are making greater use of Africa's strategic position.
No single African state can protect the Bab el-Mandeb Strait alone, but governments can mitigate some consequences by diversifying port access and inland trade routes. A more direct lever is improving maritime security capacity at the regional level. In August 2026, state signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct met to discuss enhanced cooperation, though concrete commitments remain limited.
The Houthi advances have also drawn attention to the broader impact on Asia's energy lifelines, as shipping disruptions affect oil and gas flows to major Asian economies. For African states, the immediate priority is to bolster maritime security and reduce dependence on a single chokepoint. But as the Houthis expand their reach, the Red Sea's African shore is increasingly exposed—and has begun to serve the very forces that threaten it.
