This week offered two contrasting glimpses into Indonesia's defense diplomacy. In Jakarta, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby met with Indonesian Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, part of a Southeast Asian tour that also included the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia. Almost simultaneously, China's state-run Global Times reported that the Chinese warship Honghe would conduct a joint navigation exercise with an Indonesian navy vessel in mid-August, in waters east of Taiwan.
The juxtaposition was striking: one event was a public, photographed affair with exchanged gifts and statements about strengthening defense ties; the other was a brief, matter-of-fact announcement from a Chinese state outlet, with no accompanying press conference. Yet both were, in essence, bids for Jakarta's trust and favor. Indonesia, as Southeast Asia's largest economy and astride critical shipping lanes, is a coveted partner for both Washington and Beijing.
Whether the timing was deliberate or coincidental, the message was clear: China can offer military cooperation even as the US courts the same ally. The Global Times report described the upcoming drill in benign terms—communication practice, supply exercises, and language about deepening cooperation and 'safeguarding regional peace and stability.' But the same article also included footage of the Honghe facing off with a larger foreign warship near the Taiwan Strait earlier this year, a 20-hour standoff with ships within 100 to 200 meters of each other. Placing a friendly drill announcement next to a tense confrontation clip is no accident; it subtly links Indonesia's navy to China's show of strength near one of Asia's most sensitive flashpoints.
A history of cautious cooperation
Indonesia and China have a history of naval ties, though they have been uneven. Their first joint drills, code-named Sharp Knife, were suspended around 2015 after friction over illegal Chinese fishing near Indonesia's Natuna Islands—waters Jakarta claims but Beijing asserts historic fishing rights. Bilateral exercises resumed only in 2021, with renewed interest after 2024 when President Prabowo Subianto met China's foreign minister to discuss restarting joint exercises. Against that backdrop, this drill looks less like a sudden shift and more like a step in a slow rebuilding of trust.
Indonesia also trains with other militaries, often in the same disputed waters. Jakarta has hosted the Multilateral Naval Exercise Komodo, led the first ASEAN Solidarity Exercise in the Natuna Sea in 2023, and holds the large annual Garuda Shield exercise with the US. Its foreign policy has long been described as 'free and active,' meaning it avoids taking sides and maintains good relations with all, including Russia, which has also held naval drills with ASEAN. In that light, a drill with China this month and a meeting with a US official the same week could simply be Jakarta doing what it always does—keeping its door open.
Still, the choice of location east of Taiwan raises a fair question that deserves a clearer answer than either government has provided. Was it chosen for practical reasons, tied to Chinese ships' routes, or does it serve as a signal that China can bring other navies into waters near a dispute many nations avoid? Indonesian officials have not explained the selection, and Chinese state media is not a neutral source on the matter. Its language about 'peace and stability' reflects Beijing's framing, not an independent account. Similarly, Washington's statements about 'durable peace through strength' are equally crafted.
None of this implies Indonesia has done anything wrong. Small and mid-sized countries in the region are accustomed to managing pressure from larger powers, and hedging is a reasonable strategy, not a betrayal. Indonesia has previously accepted Chinese help without compromising its position—for instance, when Beijing sent rescue ships after an Indonesian submarine sank in 2021, an offer accepted even as trust over Natuna remained thin.
But when a naval exercise is tied, even by name, to waters near Taiwan, the public deserves a plainer explanation from Jakarta about what it involves and why that location was chosen. Quiet announcements during high-profile visits are worth noting, not because they prove a hidden plan, but because they show how easily ordinary military cooperation can be used to send a message unrelated to the exercise itself. Jakarta does not need to choose between Washington and Beijing, but it must keep explaining its choices clearly to its own people, especially when those choices touch a place as sensitive as the waters near Taiwan.
