The suicide bombing and gun attack that killed dozens in northwest Pakistan on September 18, 2026, highlighted the fragile security situation in the South Asian country. But it also shone a light on the complex and evolving extremism landscape there and the strained relationship between Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.
The assault took place as worshipers gathered for Friday prayers in the city of Kohat, in Khyber Puktunkhwa province, northwest Pakistan. A suicide bomber rammed an explosives-laden car through the wall of a police complex in the city of Kohat, targeting the mosque inside. Gunmen then exchanged fire with law enforcement officials during a 20-hour standoff. In all, 31 people were killed, including 16 police officers, while over 100 people were reported injured.
Supporters of the militant group Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, or IMP, claimed responsibility on encrypted apps like Telegram. But other seemingly aligned groups distanced themselves from the attack. Pakistan responded by conducting airstrikes in Afghanistan, home to at least one of the gunmen.
Over the past two years, we have conducted fieldwork in this region and closely monitored the operational and propaganda activity of violent extremist groups, including the IMP. The attack and its fallout reveal much about the state of collaboration and friction among the various militant entities that have fueled violence.
Who is Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan?
The IMP is a jihadist coalition formed in April 2025 from three smaller militant factions: Lashkar-e-Islam, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group and Inqilab-e-Islami Pakistan. By late 2025, it had become the most active jihadist group in Pakistan after the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, also referred to as the Pakistani Taliban.
The IMP’s main objectives appear to be weakening the Pakistani state through attacks on police and security forces and advancing Islamist rule. Its operations are largely concentrated in northwest Pakistan in areas along the Afghan border, where the group has used tactics including deadly suicide bombings, vehicle-borne improvised explosives and rockets. Prior to the Kohat attack, IMP members were responsible for a May 2026 checkpost assault that killed 15 police and a July vehicle bomb attack at a police station in the city of Bannu.
The IMP styles itself as a unified front that brings various jihadist factions operating in Pakistan together under one command. Its recent propaganda, for example, includes a video by a religious cleric urging unity among jihadists. That message aligns with that of Al‑Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS, to which the IMP is linked. In recent years, AQIS has sought to become the backbone of a united coalition operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
But attempts to unify the various militant groups operating in Pakistan appear to have been undermined by the specifics of the Kohat attack. Indeed, the targeting of a mosque – and the extent of civilian deaths – prompted an intra-jihadist quarrel. Within hours, the Pakistani Taliban and another group, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, released statements denouncing the attack and disavowing any role. The Afghan Taliban, whose leadership the Pakistani Taliban pledges allegiance to and which Islamabad accuses of sheltering the group, also condemned the attack. AQIS likewise criticized the attack and urged followers to avoid activities that could taint their aim, ideology and operations.
For AQIS, the fallout is particularly damaging: It had spent the preceding months showcasing IMP as a model affiliate and a unifying force in the contemporary jihadist landscape. By mid-2026, AQIS was promoting the IMP as one of its global fronts. The June-July issue of its flagship magazine, Nawa-e-Ghazwa-e-Hind, featured the IMP’s campaign in Pakistan in an infographic. And a May editorial had urged greater coordination among jihadi groups, citing IMP-aligned cooperation as the model.
Militant convergence and competition
The ongoing intra-group disquiet should not distract from the larger picture of violent extremism in the region. Pakistan is facing its most serious security crisis in two decades; the country now ranks first in the Global Terrorism Index. Driving this trend is a combination of organizational convergence and competition among extremist groups, including local and transnational jihadist groups, as well as separatist groups in the southwestern province of Balochistan.
With respect to the jihadist groups, the Pakistani Taliban has absorbed more than a hundred factions since 2020, while AQIS has drawn the IMP into its orbit. AQIS and the Pakistani Taliban, however, remain distinct entities. Though there have been indications of occasional collaboration in their activities, various attempts at a formal merger have repeatedly failed since 2020, owing to ideological differences that persist. Most notably, AQIS has transnational ambitions, while the Pakistani Taliban’s focus is on Pakistan.
This dynamic of convergence is also evident in Balochistan, where key ethnonationalist groups have consolidated since 2018 under the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar umbrella. At the same time, fault lines in the wider regional militant landscape have also driven violence. The Islamic State Khorasan Province – the Islamic State group’s official affiliate in the region – remains hostile to the Pakistani Taliban, AQIS and IMP alike – as well as to the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani government. As a transnational group competing with locally rooted actors, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, or ISKP, encourages a cascading trend of extreme violence.
A second subtler form of competition runs within the Pakistan Taliban-AQIS-IMP axis itself. Nominally allies, the groups compete for relevance, resources and recruits by outbidding one another with more extreme tactics. It is precisely that logic that appears to lie behind the Kohat attack, which was designed to outflank rivals in brutality. The result is a volatile mix that threatens to destabilize not only Pakistan but the entire region, as Islamabad’s retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan risk further alienating Kabul and fueling a cycle of cross-border violence.
