The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is not an isolated incident but the latest in a series of shocks dismantling the global trade and economic order established after the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. While the strait may eventually reopen—U.S. President Donald Trump claimed on social media that negotiations involving Saudi Arabia's Mohammed bin Salman, the UAE's Mohammed bin Zayed, Qatar's Emir Tamim, Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir, Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Egypt's Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Jordan's King Abdullah II, Bahrain's King Hamad, and Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu have largely concluded an agreement to open it—the underlying fractures remain.
This crisis makes clear that seamless globalization no longer functions. Trade must now be guaranteed by military force, reminiscent of 19th-century practices. Bilateral and multilateral exchanges carry inherent risk. Even during the Cold War, the two superpowers maintained codes of conduct that allowed trade within blocs and occasional cross-bloc exchanges, such as Western oil purchases from the Soviet Union during the 1970s OPEC crisis. Today, no such gentlemen's agreements govern the chaos; events and ad hoc bargaining prevail.
Four Blows to the Old Order
The first blow was the gradual closure of the Chinese market and the non-full convertibility of the renminbi. This effectively separates China—the world's largest industrial power and second-largest commercial power—from the free circulation of goods and services. Economists Mark Sobel and Brad Setser have argued that China's growing trade surplus and undervalued currency exacerbate global imbalances.
The second blow came from Washington's response: 19th-century-style tariffs imposed by President Trump, affecting not just China but all nations with trade surpluses against the United States. For Beijing, these tariffs reveal not Chinese isolation but the unsustainability of America's consumption-driven, de-industrialized, over-financialized economy. Economist Wang Jian warned over two decades ago, before the 2008 financial crisis, that the U.S. was a "paper economy" that could not hold. China, he argued, had no choice but to create its own alternative system—a view the 2008 crisis seemed to confirm.
The third blow is the Strait of Hormuz blockade, which raises the prospect of militarizing any of the world's strategic straits, multiplying costs and entropy for the U.S. and its allies. China, which has long prepared to withstand fallout from U.S.-led globalization, sees this as a new fault line for Washington.
The fourth blow is migration pressure sweeping the Western world. This represents a deeper shift: the end of five centuries of Western global dominance. Many white Westerners feel displaced, reacting with opposition rather than adaptation, increasing friction and entropy.
These developments reflect an epistemological challenge. The old world is gone, and China appears to grasp this most clearly. Beijing has organized congresses on elevating its diplomatic practices into academic theories and public knowledge. Liu Qing, vice president of the China Institute of International Studies, argues that Western international relations theories are fundamentally shaped by Western centrism, whereas China's independent knowledge system offers an alternative.
This reshaping of global order has direct implications for Asia. The end of free trade is accelerating, with both Washington and Beijing turning inward. Meanwhile, figures like Elon Musk promote 'Fortress Futurism', further fragmenting the global system. The Strait of Hormuz crisis is not an endpoint but a symptom of a world order in transition, where Asia's distinct nations must navigate an increasingly volatile landscape.
