It may be the indulgent habit of a contrarian to spend a week like this one writing about anything except Nvidia. Far better-informed commentators are covering those events with far more interesting theories. We will have our say in the final section.
Some weeks seem to hold a year. This one was meant for digesting the previous week’s US elections. It had other plans, even without Nvidia. Attention went first to the most salacious story. In the financial world, it went next to the numbers in Anthropic’s listing documents. Both are well covered elsewhere, so we will mostly leave them there. One overlooked page of that filing is the exception.
Our interest is in what the week means for fundamental investing into 2027. The clues sat in items that passed with barely a mention. A routine upgrade, with no villain anywhere, switched off email in more than 70 countries. A piece of software designed a working gadget from a single paragraph of instructions. A company known for delivering dinner released one of the largest AI models ever built.
A confession belongs here. In “The Customization Paradox” earlier this year, we admitted that our own computer was warm before sunrise, busy with agents that had worked through the night. Things have moved on. The ever-reliable Mac now freezes, drops applications, and misbehaves in ways it never did in all its years of quiet service. Nothing is wrong with it. It is simply never idle anymore.
That Mac is the essay in miniature. In “Big Theme: Quantity Ahoy” we argued that the multitude of machines raises complexity faster than anyone can follow. This week added the second half: the multitude also raises the workload. The irony is hard to miss. The world spent the week asking whether a giant company, or AI itself, can survive the exit of one personality. The problems that surfaced came from the opposite direction, from too many and too much. Two things follow that have had almost no discussion. The machines are overworked. And, nothing has been kept in reserve for the day they fail. This is more true for an increasingly critical, harder-working, never-ceasing AI than it was for Microsoft Outlook. The rest of this essay follows that thread and what it means for the years ahead.
Three failures in two days
On Thursday, Microsoft Outlook stopped working. It stayed broken for more than 24 hours. On Friday, American aviation ordered a nationwide halt to departures. That evening Workday, which runs payroll for thousands of large employers, went dark after a test of its own backup systems. Surprisingly and thankfully, none of the three was a hack, even as hacks keep up their rising, low-grade menace every day through refrigerators, elevators, and websites.
All three began with routine work: an upgrade, new equipment, a backup drill. AI agents played no part. The common cause is arithmetic. When many things are connected, the ways they can affect one another grow far faster than the things themselves, and far faster than anyone’s understanding of them, the system’s own included. Ten parts make 45 pairs. Ten thousand make almost 50 million. If each of those ten thousand can interact with two others at once instead of one, the number of combinations explodes to almost 167 billion. There is no point thinking about the complexity with each one connected to three or four more.
So an upgrade or a drill can set off a failure nobody could have foreseen. Microsoft and American aviation learned this in public. Workday’s lesson has had far less attention than it deserves.
Complexity is only one consequence of the multitude. The other is plainer and, as far as we can tell, barely discussed: workload. More connected things means more interactions that can go wrong. It also means, simply, more work. Cybersecurity is the concerning consequence of complexity. Catastrophic failures will come from overworked infrastructure. One implication is the need for infrastructure redundancies to keep things working. In short, the demand for chips could be exponentially higher than projected, partly to factor in the lower utilizations at which the machines must operate and partly because of the opportunities from the multitude we discuss below.
The email recovery during the Microsoft outage gave a preview. Each time engineers revived the servers, every locked-out device and program was already knocking, again and again, and the servers fell over. Software does not wait politely. It retries. That is the habit of a new kind of machine or agent user in AI. It does not sleep, take weekends, or give up after the third attempt. It began on individual desks, which is why our Mac runs warm. It has since moved to the cloud, where assistants such as Muse and Instinct hand each person a rented computer that never logs off. Most requests on the web are now made by software. Gadgets, cars, and factory equipment will likely follow.
So far, the hardware worry has been about AI chips, the scarcity we called Silicon Shock. This week points past them. The ordinary machinery was built for the old kind of user. Networks assumed a rush hour and a quiet night for repairs. Server fleets assumed people who log off. The new user hums through the night, so the plain servers, switches, and memory behind email and payroll need upgrading too, much as our Mac does. They also need spares. Anyone who has tried to buy better hardware lately knows the wait: even unglamorous server chips take half a year to arrive.
The AI companies learned the same thing this week. Both OpenAI and Anthropic found their tools cut off from customers’ mailboxes and calendars. The most advanced software on earth stands on very ordinary plumbing. That plumbing is now part of the hardware story.
The spare nobody budgeted
The standard response to weeks like this is software. Better isolation, smarter rerouting, cleverer checks. All of it helps. None of it creates room. Diverted traffic needs somewhere to go. The only answer is physical redundancy: more servers, more switches, more memory, more bandwidth. That means more chips, more power, more cooling. For Asia, home to the world’s semiconductor fabs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, this is a double-edged sword. The demand for chips could surge beyond current projections, as Asia's central banks diversify reserves and invest in digital infrastructure. But the strain on power grids and supply chains is real, as seen in global oil reserves nearing operational floor, which could raise energy costs for data centers.
The week’s events are a warning. The world’s digital backbone is running on empty, with no reserve for the inevitable failures. The next decade will be defined not by the brilliance of AI, but by the mundane work of keeping the lights on. For investors, the opportunity lies in the unglamorous: redundancy, resilience, and the chips that make it possible. For policymakers from Seoul to Singapore, the lesson is clear: collective punishment is not the answer; building spare capacity is.


