For decades, the prevailing wisdom among Western economists and policymakers held that opening a country's economy would inevitably nudge it toward democracy. The logic was elegant: privatize state enterprises, deregulate markets, and welcome foreign trade and investment, and citizens would gain the economic independence to demand political freedoms. But reality has proven far messier. According to the V-Dem Project, 41% of the world's population now lives in countries that are becoming more authoritarian, and many autocracies have grown more repressive even as they liberalize their economies.
Jose Kaire, a political scientist at Arizona State University, tackles this paradox in his new book, The Road to Repression. In an interview with Asian Examiner, Kaire argues that economic liberalization often backfires because it threatens the political elites who prop up autocratic rulers. Rather than empowering citizens, reform can trigger a crackdown designed to reassure regime insiders that their interests remain protected.
The Elite Dilemma
Kaire's theory starts with a simple observation: autocratic leaders depend on a coalition of party officials, military officers, and other insiders. Economic liberalization, by empowering new business classes and opposition figures, risks diluting the old guard's influence. Leaders who push reform too far may alienate these elites, inviting a coup. To prevent that, they often resort to repression—not merely to silence dissent, but to signal loyalty to their coalition.
“Repression, in this sense, is not just about silencing dissent—it's about managing elite politics,” Kaire explains. He cites Mexico as a case study: presidents there cracked down on opposition groups they had long tolerated, compensating the party elite for accepting reforms that threatened their political clout.
This dynamic has played out across Asia. In Malaysia, for instance, the Mahathir Mohamad era saw economic liberalization alongside the use of the Internal Security Act to detain activists. In Indonesia under Suharto, deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a tightening of military control over dissent. The pattern is not universal—about half of autocracies experience it—but it is common enough to challenge the Washington Consensus that economic reform naturally breeds political freedom.
Asia's Autocratic Spectrum
The theory has particular resonance for Asia, home to a diverse array of autocratic and hybrid regimes. In China, President Xi Jinping has pursued market-oriented reforms while simultaneously expanding state surveillance and cracking down on civil society. The real estate bust has only intensified the regime's need to manage elite discontent. In Vietnam, General Secretary To Lam's anti-graft campaign has targeted both political rivals and business figures, as explored in our recent analysis.
Kaire's framework also sheds light on Southeast Asia's military-dominated economies. In Thailand, successive coups have followed periods of economic opening, as elites jockeyed for control over liberalized sectors. In Myanmar, the brief democratic interlude after 2011 was accompanied by economic reforms, but the military's 2021 coup showed how quickly repression can return when elites feel threatened.
The key variable, Kaire argues, is the relative strength of elites versus the leader. When elites are strong, dictators must accommodate them—often through repression. When elites are weak, leaders have more room to liberalize without cracking down. This distinction helps explain why some autocracies, like Singapore, have maintained stability while opening their economies: the People's Action Party has kept elites tightly controlled.
Implications for Cuba and Venezuela
Kaire applies his theory to Cuba and Venezuela, both under U.S. pressure to liberalize. In Cuba, former leader Raul Castro strengthened the Communist Party and the military, giving elites more leverage. Further economic reform, Kaire warns, could trigger more repression—a trend already visible in recent crackdowns on protesters. In Venezuela, the removal of Nicolás Maduro in a U.S. raid in January 2026 might empower regime insiders, potentially leading to a similar outcome if deregulation proceeds.
For Asia, the lesson is sobering. External pressure for economic reform—whether from Washington, Beijing, or international institutions—may not improve human rights. Instead, it could entrench authoritarianism by forcing leaders to choose between elite loyalty and international approval. As Kaire puts it, “If current dynamics persist, external pressure for economic reform is unlikely to improve human rights—and may well make them worse.”
The findings also resonate with broader trends in the Indo-Pacific. The AI-driven economic transformation is creating new winners and losers, potentially destabilizing elite coalitions. And as global inequality deepens, the gap between liberalized economies and political repression may only widen.
Kaire's work is a timely reminder that democracy is not an automatic byproduct of economic freedom. For policymakers and observers alike, understanding the political calculus of autocratic elites is essential—especially in a region where economic dynamism and political repression often go hand in hand.
