When US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in Beijing in May, the two governments offered sharply different accounts of what was discussed. Beijing's official summary described Taiwan as "the most important issue" in the bilateral relationship and urged Washington to exercise "extra caution." The White House's version focused on trade, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz—with no mention of Taiwan.
That divergence does not prove a secret bargain, but it underscores why the expected follow-up meeting deserves close attention. Trump has invited Xi to Washington on September 24, though Beijing has not publicly confirmed the date. If the summit proceeds, Taiwan should look beyond whether Taiwan appears on the formal agenda. The deeper risk is that Beijing may use Washington's desire for stability to secure restraints it cannot impose directly on Taipei.
A convergence of incentives
Much has changed since May. The possibility of war with Iran, pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, secondary sanctions, tariffs, and controls on artificial intelligence and semiconductors now overlap. Washington wants to prevent several crises from peaking at once; Beijing wants relief from economic and technological pressure. Neither side needs to resolve its fundamental disputes to reach a temporary accommodation—it only needs to prevent them from becoming acute at the same time.
Beijing's direct pressure has failed to make its political formula more attractive in Taiwan. Military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, and political warnings have instead reinforced distrust. Recent official polling still shows overwhelming opposition to "one country, two systems" and to unification under the Chinese Communist Party.
Beijing has another route. Taiwan relies heavily on US security support, giving Washington influence over Taipei that Beijing lacks. Taiwanese leaders can reject a demand from China. It is harder to dismiss an American warning that a particular initiative could destabilize the Taiwan Strait or complicate US strategy elsewhere.
From Beijing's perspective, the shortest political route to Taipei may therefore run through Washington. Beijing can tell Washington that certain Taiwanese actions threaten the stability both powers say they want. If US officials grow concerned about escalation, they may press Taipei to show restraint. What China cannot win through direct coercion, it may try to obtain through American crisis management.
A precedent from 2003
There is precedent for this dynamic. In December 2003, during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Washington, President George W. Bush publicly opposed unilateral moves by either side and pointedly criticized then-president Chen Shui-bian's proposed referendum. The US remained opposed to Chinese coercion, but the episode showed that American pressure could restrain Taipei. Beijing may have drawn a durable lesson: US influence over Taiwan can sometimes achieve what Chinese threats cannot.
Trump's transactional diplomacy makes that lesson newly relevant. His administration is juggling Iran, trade, technology, and Taiwan, while Beijing can offer cooperation or restraint on some files and seek movement on others. No collusion or formal bargain would be necessary. The two sides' incentives need only converge, leaving the most consequential accommodation tacit. Taiwan could thus slip into a quieter agenda, managed below the level of public confrontation while broader US-China bargaining continues.
Silence is not inherently sinister. Washington may keep Taiwan out of a formal agenda precisely because it rejects Beijing's claim to a say in US arms sales or Taiwan's political future. Less public rhetoric or military signaling can also reduce miscalculation without weakening underlying commitments.
The question is what accompanies the silence. Watch for a pattern: arms-sale approvals or announcements repeatedly postponed, senior-level contacts pared back, or security cooperation slowed at roughly the same time that Beijing moderates military pressure or assists Washington on Iran, trade, or other priorities. Each development may have an ordinary explanation. Repeated timing, reciprocity, and cross-issue linkage would be harder to dismiss.
Taipei should not demand that Taiwan appear on every Trump-Xi agenda. Beijing formally treats Taiwan as an internal Chinese matter and rejects outside interference. Yet in direct US-China great-power bargaining, it has found tactical value in Washington's leverage over Taipei. Making Taiwan a bilateral agenda item could reinforce that mechanism.
Taiwan need not be discussed, but it shouldn't be decided upon in its absence. In practice, that requires close consultation with Washington before and after major US-China summits; sustained investment in defense and societal resilience; and deeper ties with Japan, Europe, Australia, and other democratic partners. Taipei must also make the case that deterrence and responsible risk reduction are complementary goals.
US-China dialogue can lower the risk of war, and Taiwan has no interest in opposing diplomacy for its own sake. The danger begins when "stability" comes to mean narrowing Taiwan's room for action so that Washington and Beijing can more easily manage their wider relationship. For Beijing, that would be an attractive outcome: Taiwan simultaneously constrained by Chinese pressure and American caution. Washington should ensure that its role as Taiwan's principal security partner does not gradually become that of an indirect enforcer of Beijing's preferences.
As the expected follow-up Trump-Xi summit approaches, the key question is who gets to define stability in the Taiwan Strait, and who is expected to pay for it. Taiwan should welcome serious efforts to reduce great-power risk. But it cannot afford to become the object of great-power management. Related coverage: the broader shift from decoupling to leverage and the emerging orbital dimension of the Taiwan contingency.
