In 1938, after the Munich agreement allowed Nazi Germany to annex part of Czechoslovakia, Winston Churchill described the fate of that country in a haunting phrase: “Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness.” Today, a similar shadow hangs over Afghanistan, a quarter-century after the September 11 attacks and the US-led invasion that reshaped the country.
Yet there is little appetite in Western policy circles to examine what actually happened in Afghanistan during those two decades. Instead, a convenient narrative has emerged: that democracy was never suited to Afghan soil, and that the Taliban’s return was somehow an expression of authentic Afghan culture. This view ignores the evidence. The Asia Foundation’s respected Survey of the Afghan People found that in 2021, 88% of respondents expressed “no sympathy at all” for the Taliban.
The Afghan republic’s story deserves more careful study, not only for historical accuracy but for the lessons it offers for future interventions and state-building efforts.
What went right
Amid the post-mortems of the US mission, it is easy to forget the genuine achievements of the Afghan Republic. As I document in a book coauthored with Afghan researcher Ahmad Shuja Jamal, a generation of Afghans grew up in an era of globalization. By 2021, nearly 70% of the population relied on television for news. Per capita incomes rose, a vibrant civil society emerged, and the media became the freest in the region. Health indicators improved across the board, and girls’ access to education expanded dramatically, especially in urban centers.
These gains were sometimes overstated by Western donors, but they were real. They were not trivial. They represented a break from the past and a foundation for a different future.
What went wrong
But much went wrong, and much of that was of Washington’s making. The institutional design imposed after 2001 created an overcentralized, complex state. Power was concentrated in the presidency, fostering a “neopatrimonial” system where formal institutions were intertwined with patronage networks. Bureaucratic complexity, combined with a flood of aid money, fueled corruption. From 2009 onward, several elections were marred by fraud that senior Western officials failed to confront.
The Afghan National Army was built to be interoperable with US forces, which made it dependent on American civilian contractors for maintenance of sophisticated equipment. When those contractors left, the army was left vulnerable. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 diverted attention and resources at a critical moment, and Pakistan, the Taliban’s original patron, resumed its meddling to block a pro-Indian government in Kabul. Successive US presidents failed to pressure Islamabad effectively. In 2021, General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted that never “effectively dealing with Pakistan” was a critical error.
Washington also misread the Taliban. Despite the group being responsible for the majority of civilian casualties year after year, the Trump administration began “peace” negotiations with the Taliban in 2018, excluding the Afghan government. The Doha agreement of February 2020, signed by US envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, was a strategic blunder. As Thomas Hobbes warned, “reputation of power is power.” The Taliban saw the deal as a way to detach the Afghan army from its lifeline of contractors, and the US walked into the trap.
President Joe Biden’s reckless execution of the withdrawal in August 2021 sealed the fate of the republic. The chaotic scenes at Kabul airport, the collapse of the army, and the Taliban’s return were the direct consequences of decisions made in Washington, not of any inherent Afghan failure.
Today, the Taliban seeks to project an image of reform and inclusivity, and some US experts who supported the abandonment continue to whitewash the group. But the reality on the ground is stark. As Taliban rule pushes Afghanistan to the brink, with growing resistance, the consequences of US policy are clear. The economic collapse under Taliban mismanagement, as Afghanistan's economy remains crippled, is a direct result of the international community’s abandonment.
The Afghan people were not doomed to fail. They were failed by those who promised to stand with them and then left them to the darkness.
