What is the fundamental purpose of NATO? Recent events—the defense ministers' summit on June 18 and the NATO Secretary General's visit to Washington ahead of the July 7-8 leaders' summit in Turkey—have created the impression that the alliance's main objective is to placate one of its members, Donald Trump, rather than address the military threat from Russia, the very country NATO was established in 1949 to counter.
Four years into the war in Ukraine, with Russia conducting regular military provocations across Europe, this core issue has become dangerously secondary to the effort of keeping the United States engaged. Last year, as Trump began his second term, it seemed prudent to try to maintain American commitment to Ukraine, Europe, and thus NATO. An alliance that has served both sides of the Atlantic for nearly eight decades should not be discarded due to the whims of a single president, who, if the US Constitution remains intact, will be gone by early 2029.
Even if Trump could not be persuaded to support Ukraine as his predecessor Joe Biden did, he could at least be cajoled into not actively harming Ukraine or aiding Russia. A year and a half later, the only clear success of this strategy is that America has not directly hurt Ukraine. Additionally, Trump's attempt to seize Greenland from Denmark failed, thanks to a strong, unified response from other NATO members.
Otherwise, the record is distinctly negative. America has repeatedly helped Russia, including by welcoming Vladimir Putin to a summit on US soil in August last year—the first such visit since 2007—by pressuring Ukraine to cede territory to Russia, and by relaxing sanctions on Russian oil during the Iran war. Now, Washington has announced a six-month review expected to lead to some US force withdrawals from Europe and has accused European NATO allies of “disloyalty” for not joining America in Iran.
Leverage and the Balance of Power
This dispute over supporting America in Iran has had one positive outcome. It prompted NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to reveal the number of American warplanes that took off from US bases in Europe during the Iran war: 4,000 to 5,000 flights, about 500 of which were from bases in Italy. This has sparked a furor in Italy's parliament over whether allowing these flights constitutes direct participation in a war that most European governments and public opinion opposed. Regardless, the military implication is clear: the United States gains enormous benefit from its more than 40 military bases in the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Turkey.
The entire European continent acts as a massive fleet of aircraft carriers for the United States, enabling it to station combat forces and surveillance equipment much closer to potential targets than if they were back in America. US politicians often claim these bases mean the US military is protecting Europe, but in reality, they are crucial to America's ability to project power globally. Only when the United States decides it no longer wishes to be a global power will these European bases become redundant to its national interests.
This means the balance of power within NATO should have shifted along with the change in benefits from American membership. Now that the United States, under Trump, no longer sees Russia as a threat but as a potential great-power partner, the benefit to European NATO states of having America as a member has plummeted. Yet the value to the United States of those 40-plus bases in the UK, the EU, and Turkey is as high as ever.
It was once thought that US membership in NATO was vital for its deterrent effect—that the mere threat of American military intervention would persuade any potential adversary, namely Russia, that an attack was not worth the risk. But Trump has made clear he does not believe in the commitment to mutual defense under the NATO treaty, so until another president arrives with a different view, that deterrent effect is lost.
European NATO members are right to hope that when a new president comes in 2029, the American attitude will change. Restructuring military and political institutions takes time—certainly longer than the two and a half years remaining in Trump's term—so preserving existing structures makes sense. But in the meantime, European members should recognize their leverage: whatever Trump says, America needs NATO more than Europe needs America.
Accordingly, appeasement should cease. When Trump or his officials attack Europe, they can and should be resisted strongly, as Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni did when Trump claimed she had “begged” him for a selfie at last week's G7 meeting in France. European leaders can and should remind Trump and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth that America's possession of military bases in Europe is a privilege, not a right.
More important than dealing robustly with America, however, is avoiding distraction from NATO's central mission: preventing Russia from destabilizing Europe and threatening its security. Discussions about this mission have already largely moved from NATO to the European Union and to informal structures that include the United Kingdom. These new structures now need higher priority. What is needed is a credible military command structure that, in a time of crisis, will not be vulnerable to interference from the United States.
