The recent allegations surrounding Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang have thrust the shadowy practice of “sexpionage” back into the spotlight. US intelligence officials believe that Alice Huang, a business executive with ties to a Nvidia partner, may have connections to Chinese intelligence. The company has launched its own investigation, and President Donald Trump has confirmed FBI involvement. Beijing has dismissed the claims as a baseless smear.
The episode raises a critical question for Western corporations and governments: do they truly understand how information flows out of partnerships with Chinese entities? My assessment is that they do not. This is partly because Chinese intelligence is often perceived as a mirror of Western agencies, which are heavily regulated and scrutinized. But China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law obliges organizations and citizens to support state intelligence work. Any partner with meaningful ties to China is thus a potential conduit, whether or not they have been formally recruited.
A long history of sexual compromise
Sexpionage is not a new phenomenon. The promise of a fallen man—nearly always a man—has been a staple of espionage lore for over a century. The Profumo scandal of the 1960s, in which the UK’s secretary for war had an affair with a woman who was also involved with a Soviet attaché, remains a classic example. More recently, the Jeffrey Epstein case has hinted at the intersection of sexual abuse and intelligence compromise.
Even the Bible contains an early instance: Rahab, a woman in Jericho, used her access to military leaders to pass secrets to the Israelites. In the modern era, Mata Hari, a Dutch dancer, was executed in 1917 after promising intelligence to both French and German militaries, leveraging her relationships with senior officers on both sides.
During the Cold War, Soviet and East German agencies refined the use of “honeytrap” agents—ordinary-looking, well-educated men and women who could form believable relationships. These relationships often began without coercion, making the betrayal of secrets more enduring and deniable. Numerous Western officials were recalled from Moscow and satellite states after being caught in compromising situations. Some, like British civil servant John Vassall, were never detected and spied for the Soviets for years.
Intelligence agencies also exploited closeted gay men, such as Vassall and Canadian ambassador John Watkins, whose exposure could lead to prosecution if they did not cooperate.
Why sexpionage works
According to author Henry Schlesinger, sexpionage serves four purposes. First, it can control or coerce a target into spying. Second, it collects “pillow talk”—injudicious comments made in intimate moments, as well as access to phones and computers. Third, it gathers information for further exploitation, such as minor legal infractions that can be leveraged. Fourth, it provides a means to discredit protest or political movements, as seen in the UK’s Undercover Policing Inquiry, where undercover officers engaged in sexual relationships to undermine activist groups from the 1970s to 2011.
For China, targeting tech executives like Jensen Huang makes strategic sense. Beijing seeks forewarning of US government decisions, especially regarding export controls and the reliance of the US tech industry on Taiwan. Access to finance and technology leaders is invaluable.
Yet private firms are not obliged to engage in counterintelligence. Stopping a lucrative partnership because of potential exposure to a foreign government could be seen as bad business. However, the market’s reaction to the Nvidia allegations—a $330 billion drop in share price—suggests that investors are paying attention. As the investigation unfolds, the case may serve as a wake-up call for Western companies about the hidden costs of doing business in a world where intelligence and commerce increasingly intersect.
