The US F-35 stealth fighter program, the Pentagon's most expensive weapons project, is facing a dual threat: chronic supply-chain mismanagement and China's persistent espionage. A new Government Accountability Office (GAO) report reveals that the Department of Defense (DoD) cannot account for tens of millions of dollars in components, raising alarms that Beijing could exploit these gaps to advance its rival J-35 fighter and challenge US air superiority across the Indo-Pacific.
Millions in parts unaccounted for
According to the GAO report released this month, the F-35 Joint Program Office still does not know the status of over 1 million lost parts worth more than $85 million. Additionally, roughly 17,000 maintenance-bound parts valued at up to $2.5 billion were never recorded in the property system. These critical vulnerabilities span the program's $31 billion shared pool of 26 million parts dispersed across more than 700 locations worldwide.
The report highlights that US defense officials lack real-time integration with prime contractors Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, causing records to lag by months. The DoD routinely approves loss adjustments without investigating root causes, undermining combat readiness and crippling efforts to prevent fraud, waste, or theft.
Diverted Australian parts reach China
The GAO's findings come on the heels of a disturbing incident: in September 2026, US Congressional committees launched inquiries after an Australian F-35 cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door were inexplicably diverted to Hong Kong during commercial transit. Shipped via UPS on behalf of Lockheed Martin for US repairs, the unserviceable components transited South Korea before China seized and retained them. This logistics failure has triggered US recovery efforts and heightened fears that China could exploit intact radar-absorbent materials and stealth geometry to reverse-engineer sensitive fifth-generation technology.
Sam Mullins and others, writing in an October 2026 Foreign Affairs article, argue that deepening US military partnerships and globalized supply chains are creating dangerous blind spots. They note that the accidental misdirection of Australian F-35 components demonstrates how routine logistical friction among allies, contractors, and commercial shippers can inadvertently hand critical capabilities to China. As the US accelerates defense production across the Indo-Pacific, complex multinational networks heighten the risk of industrial espionage and sabotage.
Decades of Chinese espionage
Obtaining F-35 parts through logistics misdirection is just one facet of China's broader efforts to acquire sensitive US military technology. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) documents that Chinese hackers first breached the DoD's Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) project in 2007 to steal core design data, followed by a 2012 intrusion that compromised classified onboard systems. Beyond military networks, Chinese intelligence operatives used private conspirators like Su Bin, who breached Boeing's corporate networks in 2014 to exfiltrate confidential files on the F-35, C-17, and F-22.
China may already be reaping the benefits. In a November 2024 Air & Space Forces Magazine article, US Air Force General David Allvin suggested that placing China's twin-engine J-35A, which first flew in September 2023, alongside the single-engine F-35 clearly reveals where China obtained its blueprints, citing unmistakable visual similarities. While declining to discuss classified intelligence, Allvin pointed to China's documented history of replicating US aircraft designs, though he maintained that copied airframes cannot match the superior training, maintenance, and overall force quality that preserve the US combat advantage.
The J-35's capabilities
According to the US Army ODIN database, the J-35A is a single-seat, twin-engine, fifth-generation, multirole stealth fighter built for the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). A carrier-capable naval variant features foldable wings and reinforced landing gear. Twin WS-21 afterburning turbofans power the jet, giving it a 1,200-kilometer internal combat radius and a top speed of 1,400 kilometers per hour. Its low-observable design incorporates seamless airframe shaping and fiber-mat materials effective against L- and Ku-band radars, along with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, distributed optical sensors, and six internal and six external hardpoints for air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions.
The convergence of US supply-chain failures and China's relentless espionage poses a significant challenge to allied air superiority. As the Pentagon struggles to secure its most advanced fighter, the potential for technology transfer to Beijing grows, with implications for the entire Indo-Pacific region. For more on China's military modernization, see China's DF-61 mobile ICBM and China's laser arsenal.
