Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently asserted that the war in Ukraine is shifting in Kyiv's favor, claiming that Russia is "losing the initiative each day." In an open letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin, Zelensky called for direct talks and warned that "when Russia grows tired, change comes."
History lends weight to Zelensky's argument. As journalist Gideon Rachman noted in the Financial Times, Russia has experienced dramatic political transformation four times in the past century following military defeat or a serious foreign policy blunder. The 1905 revolution, which curtailed the power of the Tsar, was sparked by Russia's humiliating loss in the Russo-Japanese War. The Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 after Russia's disastrous performance in World War I. Nikita Khrushchev's 1962 gamble of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba brought the world to the brink of nuclear war and convinced Kremlin insiders he had to go. And in 1991, just two years after withdrawing from a failed war in Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev faced a coup attempt that led to the Soviet Union's collapse.
In each case, public humiliation on the world stage exposed Moscow's weaknesses, emboldening those who sought change. But humiliation alone was not enough. A genuine sense of hardship among society or political elites—or both—was necessary to deepen the desire for change and provide impetus for action. Leaders of political change also needed opportunities to organize, gain support, and build a power base.
Signs of Strain in Russia's War Effort
Today, the war in Ukraine is increasingly becoming a public humiliation for Russia. When the so-called "special military operation" began in February 2022, Russian officers were reportedly told to pack dress uniforms for a victory parade in Kyiv. More than four years later, Russia is struggling to achieve its far more limited goal of seizing and holding the Donbas region. During 2026, Russia's rate of advance has slowed to a crawl and has even been reversed in some areas. Meanwhile, Ukraine's effective use of drones has given Kyiv the initiative, as highlighted in reports of Azov drone patrols over Mariupol.
There are signs that the Russian government recognizes it cannot achieve its war aims. In May, a leaked document revealed that the Kremlin is planning a propaganda campaign to spin the war in a way that avoids admitting none of its stated goals have been fulfilled. The conflict is also unpopular among ordinary Russians. An April opinion poll by the independent Levada Center showed 62% of Russians want the war to end, while only 27% favor continuing it. Given the pressure to give "correct" responses in such surveys for fear of state retribution, the high proportion expressing dissatisfaction is remarkable, suggesting the true extent of war weariness may be even greater.
This desire for an end to the war may stem from the conflict becoming increasingly real to Russians. While economic sanctions have been an inconvenience, Ukraine's ability to manufacture drones that strike deep into Russian territory is bringing the war home. Russian oil refineries and depots have been particular targets, driving up prices and creating shortages and petrol rationing in several regions. The intensifying air war, including drone and missile strikes, is detailed in our coverage of the escalating air campaign.
Obstacles to Political Change
Despite widespread desire for the war to end, there are no signs of mass protests that might pressure the state to end the conflict quickly or bring about real political change. Legislation rushed through days after the invasion made it an offense to spread "false information" about the military or "discredit" the armed forces. Although some individuals protest as "single pickets," most Russians are deterred by the prospect of arrest, fines, or custodial sentences.
Another factor preventing large-scale protests is the absence of any political opposition to the state. Russia's remaining prominent opposition leaders are either in exile or in prison. The state also uses legislation to declare individuals, organizations, or groups critical of the state as "foreign agents" or "undesirable organizations." Those designated as foreign agents face financial penalties and lose legal rights, including the right to stand for election. Undesirable organizations face even harsher restrictions, including bans on financial transactions and media or internet dissemination.
The extent of legal restrictions means that political change is most likely to come from inside the ruling regime. This happened in 1964 when Khrushchev was removed by a group of fellow political leaders who confronted him, and he stepped aside when he found no powerful institutions would support him. Putin is well aware of this precedent and has been careful to avoid naming a successor. He has also been effective at keeping competing interests in Russian politics at odds with each other while ensuring his own position remains secure.
For now, the war in Ukraine is creating conditions that historically have led to political change in Russia: public humiliation, societal hardship, and elite discontent. But Putin's consolidation of power, suppression of opposition, and control over the security apparatus present formidable barriers. Whether the war will ultimately bring regime change depends on whether internal fractures within the ruling elite can overcome these obstacles—a question that remains open as the conflict grinds on.
