In the early hours of an April night in 2023, somewhere in the East China Sea, a tanker linked to North Korea switched off its Automatic Identification System (AIS). For ten days, the vessel—sailing under a foreign flag—was invisible to maritime tracking. When its signal returned, it appeared to be off the coast of southern China. In reality, the ship was in a bay hundreds of kilometers away, preparing to offload oil to North Korea in direct violation of United Nations sanctions.
This incident, described by Justin Hastings, a professor of international relations at the University of Sydney, illustrates the sophisticated methods that Pyongyang's so-called shadow fleet uses to evade international oversight. Hastings, who has spent years tracking these vessels, shared his findings on The Conversation Weekly podcast, explaining why such operations have persisted for so long.
The vastness of the ocean and legal loopholes
According to Hastings, the primary reason shadow ships are so hard to catch is simple: the ocean is enormous. "It's a lot harder to find ships that don't want to be found in the ocean," he said. With millions of square kilometers of open water, a single vessel can easily disappear if it chooses to go dark.
The second factor is legal. Under international maritime law, ships on the high seas enjoy freedom of navigation. Interfering with a vessel requires specific legal justification, such as suspicion of piracy or a flag-state request. This presumption of non-interference gives shadow fleet operators a wide berth.
Hastings likens the world's oceans to the "Wild West," where enforcement is sparse and rules are often bent. He notes that other sanctioned states, including Russia and Iran, have borrowed from North Korea's playbook. For countries like Russia, which have both the financial resources and the sheer number of vessels, boarding ships is one way to at least slow down their operations, Hastings added.
The shadow fleet industry is not just about oil. It also involves the transfer of coal, refined products, and even military-related goods. These vessels often use a complex web of shell companies, flag hopping, and ship-to-ship transfers to obscure their cargoes and destinations.
Recent crackdowns by Western nations have targeted these fleets, but enforcement remains challenging. As Putin has warned of reciprocal seizures, the geopolitical stakes are rising. The shadow fleet has become a key tool for states under sanctions, allowing them to maintain trade flows and revenue streams.
For North Korea, the shadow fleet is a lifeline. Despite UN resolutions banning oil imports, the country continues to receive shipments, often through transfers at sea. The April 2023 incident was not an isolated case; similar patterns have been observed repeatedly in the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Hastings' research highlights the need for more creative enforcement strategies. He suggests that instead of trying to board every suspicious vessel, authorities could focus on disrupting the financial networks and insurance arrangements that underpin these operations. "If you can't catch the ship, you can still make it harder for them to operate," he said.
The shadow fleet phenomenon is not confined to North Korea. As Kyrgyzstan's shipping-container economy shows, informal trade networks can thrive in the gaps left by formal systems. Similarly, the shadow fleet exploits legal and logistical loopholes to move goods across the world's oceans.
For the Indo-Pacific region, the implications are significant. The East China Sea and surrounding waters are not only vital trade routes but also arenas for geopolitical competition. The presence of shadow fleets complicates maritime security and raises the risk of accidents or confrontations.
As Hastings notes, the problem is unlikely to disappear soon. "As long as there are sanctions, there will be people trying to evade them," he said. The challenge for the international community is to adapt its enforcement methods to keep pace with these ever-evolving tactics.
