At the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum this month, Russian President Vladimir Putin revived a proposal for unrestricted joint production and technology transfer of the Su-57 fifth-generation stealth fighter to India. The offer directly targets a critical shortfall in the Indian Air Force (IAF): the absence of any operational stealth platform while China rapidly expands its fleet of J-20 fighters and Pakistan reportedly prepares to acquire the Chinese J-35.
India withdrew from a similar co-development project with Russia in 2018, citing cost overruns and technology disputes. Now, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) has confirmed it is awaiting Russia's financial quotation to present to IAF officials. The dilemma for Indian defense planners is acute: procuring two to three interim Su-57 squadrons could quickly address regional threats, but the multi-billion-dollar deal risks diverting resources from India's indigenous fifth-generation fighter program, which is unlikely to be operational before 2035.
Su-57 Capabilities and Combat Record
According to the US Army's ODIN database, the Su-57 is an air-superiority and strike fighter combining low-observable features, internal weapons bays, advanced sensor fusion, and an AESA radar with exceptional maneuverability. It can supercruise at speeds up to Mach 2, sustain supersonic flight without afterburners, and has a combat range exceeding 1,500 kilometers. Extensive use of composite materials enhances stealth and reduces weight, while its aerodynamic design supports extreme high-angle-of-attack maneuvers. Russia has also produced a two-seat variant, which could serve as a mission commander for loyal wingman drones such as the Okhotnik.
The Su-57 has already been exported, with two units delivered to Algeria in November 2025 as part of a 12-aircraft order. However, its combat record in Ukraine is cautious: Russia has used the aircraft to launch standoff strikes with Kh-59/69 cruise missiles up to 400 kilometers behind the front lines, avoiding penetration of defended airspace. This mirrors the doctrine observed during the May 2025 aerial skirmishes over Kashmir, where neither India nor Pakistan crossed national borders, reflecting the seriousness with which both sides view each other's air defense capabilities.
India's Widening Capability Gap
The May 2025 clashes over Kashmir exposed significant vulnerabilities in the IAF. Peter Layton noted in a November 2025 Airspace brief that India lost two or three fighters—a French-made Rafale, a Russian-made MiG-29, and possibly a Russian-made Su-30. Most tellingly, a Chinese-made Pakistani J-10C using a long-range PL-15 missile was credited with downing one of India's Rafale jets, suggesting that Chinese weapons may now compete with leading Western systems. Pakistan's Chinese-origin kill chain—integrating HQ-9P air defense systems, J-10C fighters, and ZDK-03 AWACS—stands in contrast to India's mixed ecosystem of Western, Russian, and domestic systems, which may pose integration problems.
Moreover, Pakistan may be on the verge of a major ecosystem upgrade, with Defense Security Asia reporting this month that Islamabad may acquire the KJ-500 AWACS and HQ-19 air defense systems alongside the J-35, deepening its dependence on Chinese hardware. China has already positioned J-20 stealth fighters at Shigatse Air Base in Tibet, less than 160 kilometers from India's Sikkim border and the Siliguri Corridor. These developments may be eroding India's traditional qualitative edge in the air domain.
The IAF also faces a numerical shortfall: the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted in February 2026 that India has about 29 fighter and ground-attack squadrons, well below the minimum target of 42. This gap underscores the urgency of the Su-57 offer, but also the risk of relying on a platform with questionable production capacity.
Can Russia Deliver?
Peter Suciu pointed out in a January 2026 article for The National Interest that Russia appears to have only 32 Su-57 units, including prototypes and non-combat models—far short of its stated goal of 76 by 2027–2028. Deliveries have fallen short due to supply chain and funding constraints. With a price tag of US$100 million per aircraft, Russia has sought foreign buyers to subsidize costs. However, Ukrainian deep strikes in Russia destroyed two Su-57s on the ground in April 2026, and a fire the same month at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur plant, which produces critical composite materials for the aircraft, may further slow already low production rates.
India's decision will have broader implications for its defense posture and regional stability. As India approaches trade negotiations with the US cautiously, the Su-57 deal could also affect its relationship with Washington, which has offered F-35s to other partners. Meanwhile, the lethal heatwave gripping India and Pakistan underscores the urgency of strategic decisions in a volatile region. The Su-57 may offer a qualitative solution, but only if Russia can overcome its production realities.
