Japan and South Korea have navigated the first half of President Donald Trump's term with serious but not crippling damage to what they once considered dependable alliances. Yet the second half may prove just as fraught, as a president on the defensive at home could launch new foreign-policy initiatives where he retains considerable latitude.
With Democrats now controlling both chambers of the US Congress, they are likely to challenge Trump's confrontational stance toward Iran, his aggressive immigration enforcement, and his rollback of environmental protections. But on trade and defense priorities, the Democratic majority is hardly a comfort for East Asia: they remain as protectionist as Republicans and may still place Europe and the Middle East ahead of the Indo-Pacific.
Tokyo's unease
On Wednesday, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara reaffirmed that the US alliance "remains the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policy," essential to "maximizing its national interests," regardless of the midterm outcome. He added that the government would monitor financial markets "with a high sense of urgency."
What is new is not the evident nervousness. It is Trump's war on Iran, which has driven up energy costs, and his approach to China and North Korea that has put Tokyo on edge. The US has a history of cutting deals with Beijing behind Japan's back, dating back to Nixon and Kissinger, and Trump has repeatedly floated reviving his personal rapport with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
In August, Trump said he expected to meet with Kim by year's end, arguing that "the fact that I get along with him, that's a very good thing," particularly because North Korea possesses "57 very powerful nuclear weapons." In October, at a rally in Ohio, he boasted, "I get along great with Kim Jong Un. You know who that is? When people have 112 nuclear missiles, it's nice to get along."
So far, no meeting has been confirmed. Still, a senior Japanese official told the Yomiuri Shimbun: "We don't want them [the United States and North Korea] bypassing us to make deals." But they might. The same applies to China and Russia, which Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's government continues to alienate despite China's role as a vital trade partner and Russia's as a key supplier of oil and gas.
That friction has tangible consequences. A delegation of about 200 Japanese business leaders from the Japan-China Economic Association, including senior representatives of Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), had planned to visit China last January. They were forced to cancel after Takaichi's remark that a Chinese blockade of Taiwan could be seen as a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan, justifying a military response. Japanese business organizations found they could not arrange meetings with Chinese officials. A rescheduling attempt in November also fell through, so the trip is now slated for March. Instead, about 20 Japanese business leaders will reportedly attend the APEC summit in Shenzhen on November 18 and 19.
Seoul's strategic squeeze
On the Korean Peninsula, the situation is equally delicate. It has been more than two decades since Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi met with Kim Jong-il (Kim Jong-un's father) in 2002. According to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the aim of that visit was to achieve a breakthrough on various issues, including the abduction of Japanese citizens, and to urge North Korea to act responsibly on nuclear and missile concerns. The summit did not resolve any outstanding issues, which only grew more serious.
Trump met with Kim Jong Un three times during his first term but failed to achieve a breakthrough, although Kim and Ambassador Extraordinaire Dennis Rodman did share a love of basketball. President Biden reverted to containment, which led to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between North Korea and Russia and the economic revival of North Korea, with GDP growth above 3% per annum since 2022, according to the Bank of Korea. South Korea now faces North Korean troops battle-hardened in Ukraine and a larger, more sophisticated North Korean weapons industry.
With this in mind, many South Koreans were alarmed when Lieutenant General Joe Hilbert, commander of the US Eighth Army in South Korea, told the South China Morning Post that it would be "irresponsible to focus myopically" on threats on the Korean peninsula or to "suggest that we cannot do other things simply because we are in Korea."
The US 2026 National Defense Strategy calls for South Korea to take primary responsibility for deterring North Korea, while US forces focus on defending the first island chain, which runs from Japan to Taiwan and the Philippines. US Forces Korea Commander General Xavier Brunson went further a year ago, when he showed off his "East-Up Map" of the Western Pacific, stating: "When the same region is viewed with east orientation toward the top, the strategic picture transforms dramatically."
For Seoul and Tokyo, the message is clear: Washington's priorities are shifting, and the second half of Trump's term may bring more of the same unpredictability. As the midterm fallout reshapes Trump's Asia calculus, allies must brace for a president who may seek to cut deals that bypass them, whether on North Korea, China, or even Iran's threats to Asian energy supplies. The specter of a new great-power bargain looms, and neither Tokyo nor Seoul can afford to be left out of the room.
