In a matter of days, Houthi forces swept across Yemen's Red Sea coastline, seizing the shores of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait—a vital maritime chokepoint through which a significant share of global oil and container traffic passes. The offensive, which began on September 3, 2026, with a push to sever the strategic road linking Taiz to the port of Mokha, culminated by September 11 in the capture of Mokha, the town of Dhubab, and the island of Mayyun at the strait's mouth.
According to the United Nations, the rebels took control of roughly 2,100 square miles of territory, displacing more than 100,000 people, many of whom risked the perilous crossing to Djibouti in overcrowded boats. This marks the most significant shift in the front lines of Yemen's civil war since a UN-brokered truce froze them in April 2022.
Most international coverage has framed the offensive as a new lever for Iran—the Houthis' principal backer—in its ongoing confrontation with the United States, or as a fresh threat to Saudi Arabia and global shipping. That interpretation is not wrong, but it is incomplete. The more consequential question is what the offensive means for Yemen itself, and where it leaves both a civil war that had quietly stalemated for years and the Houthis' own unresolved problem of legitimacy.
Why advance now?
Yemen's civil strife entered a new phase in 2014 when the Houthis seized the capital Sanaa from the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. A decade of fighting between the rebels and a Saudi-led coalition brought famine and destruction to the impoverished nation. Since 2022, however, the conflict had largely stalled, with the Houthis controlling much of the northwest and Saudi-backed forces dominant in parts of the south and east.
So why have the Houthis moved now? The group's military spokesman, Yahya Saree, cited years of Saudi aggression and blockade as the trigger. Those grievances are not invented: UN agencies have documented sustained damage from coalition restrictions on Yemen's ports and airspace throughout the war. The Houthis also point to a July 13 strike on Sanaa airport's runway by Yemeni government forces with Saudi backing, which forced an Iranian aircraft carrying Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers to turn back. The Houthis declared their ceasefire with Saudi Arabia over that day, struck the Saudi city of Abha within hours, and announced a naval blockade a week later. They then opened a missile campaign in early August, well before the ground offensive on September 3.
But it is hard to read the sustained campaign and the landings on Bab el-Mandeb's islands as simple payback for an airport strike. Something more deliberate appears to have been in motion.
One factor is Iran. Since Tehran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran, Saudi Arabia has routed crude oil through Bab el-Mandeb at roughly eight times the rate of a year earlier. Houthi control of that strait hands Iran a mirror-image chokepoint to the one it holds over Hormuz. Indeed, Yemeni security sources say a senior Iranian commander, Abdul Reza Shahlai, was on the ground overseeing part of the latest operation in September.
There is also a potential economic incentive. Since March, Tehran has been charging vessels up to US$2 million per ship for safe passage through Hormuz. The Houthis may see similar leverage as a way to bolster a movement long battered by war. As Houthi advances tighten Iran's grip on global shipping lanes, the rebels may be eyeing a share of that revenue.
Forcing Riyadh back to the table
Perhaps the most important factor is that the Houthis calculated that conditions on the ground were increasingly favorable. Their already fractured opposition has become even more divided in the south, particularly after a Saudi rift with the United Arab Emirates in late 2025 led the UAE to withdraw support for anti-Houthi forces altogether. With the region engulfed in conflict and Saudi Arabia distracted, the Houthis moved against a coastal Yemeni force left exposed.
First and foremost, the Houthis are a Yemeni movement whose fight has always been about power inside Yemen. As such, they have been careful to frame the Bab el-Mandeb operation as a national, sovereign act rather than one done for their Iranian ally; they are adamant that they are not a mere proxy. As recently as 2023, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis had been negotiating a comprehensive nationwide ceasefire that would have ended Saudi restrictions and sanctions on Houthi governance. But the plan was never implemented following the Red Sea crisis of late 2023 and 2024, when the Houthis ramped up attacks on commercial shipping in response to the Israeli war in Gaza. Riyadh has shown little urgency to revive the diplomatic process since.
The Houthis may now be betting that escalating inside Yemen, where the cost to Saudi Arabia is high, is the surest way to force Riyadh back to the table. This time, they believe they have leverage to secure the political recognition they have long sought, not just the economic terms Saudi Arabia was considering in 2023. As the threat to Bab el-Mandeb risks global inflation, the stakes are higher than ever.
What the strait operation cannot buy
The seizure of the strait and the ongoing fighting come with serious risks for the Houthis. The leverage they are gaining vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and on the battlefield could come at the cost of their broader standing in Yemen. No government or entity has ever managed to hold both military and political supremacy over the entire territory of Yemen in modern history. While the Houthis have achieved military dominance in the northwest, their governance has been marked by repression and economic mismanagement, and their popularity has waned.
The offensive has already displaced over 100,000 Yemenis, many of whom are fleeing to Djibouti—a humanitarian crisis that could further erode domestic support. Moreover, the Houthis' alignment with Iran, while strategically useful, is deeply unpopular among many Yemenis who resent foreign interference. As Hezbollah faces a reckoning as support wanes in Lebanon, the Houthis may face a similar backlash if their gambit fails to deliver tangible benefits.
In the end, the Houthis' advance on the Red Sea coast is a double-edged sword. It strengthens their hand against Saudi Arabia and bolsters Iran's regional position, but it also risks alienating the very population they seek to rule. The coming months will reveal whether the rebels can translate military success into political legitimacy—or whether their latest victory will prove pyrrhic.
