For decades, the India-Israel defense relationship followed a simple pattern: Israel had the technology and expertise, India had the money and market. That equation is now shifting rapidly. India is no longer just a customer; it is becoming a manufacturer, joint-venture partner, and supplier within Israel's defense-industrial ecosystem.
This transformation extends beyond bilateral ties, linking Indian industrial capacity more directly to the security architecture of a Middle East already strained by the Gaza war and the broader confrontation between the US, Gulf states, and Iran and its proxies.
From buyer to partner
India remains one of the world's largest importers of major weapons, even as New Delhi pushes to localize production. According to SIPRI, India was the world's second-largest importer of major arms in 2021–25, accounting for 8.2% of global imports. Russia supplied 40%, France 29%, and Israel 15%.
But the relationship is now increasingly two-way. An Amnesty International investigation released in July 2026, based on shipment-level trade data, identified at least 2,596 shipments of weapons, ammunition, parts, and components from India to Israel between October 7, 2023, and November 30, 2025. These included over 390,000 small-arms parts, 564,970 explosive ordnance components, and 298 military-vehicle components.
Among the Indian suppliers are PLR Systems, a joint venture involving Adani Defence & Aerospace and Israel Weapon Industries; Alpha Elsec Defence & Aerospace Systems, linked to Elbit Systems; and state-owned Munitions India Limited. Amnesty traced machine-gun parts, components for 155mm high-explosive artillery ammunition, warheads for Sky Striker loitering munitions, and armored-vehicle components.
The significance lies less in the raw numbers than in what they reveal about the changing structure of the relationship. Indian factories are becoming integrated into Israeli supply chains, supporting New Delhi's push for domestic manufacturing while deepening interdependence.
Gaza changes the calculus
Under different circumstances, this evolution might have attracted less attention. But the Gaza war and the US-Israel conflict with Iran have fundamentally changed the political and legal environment around military transfers to Israel. Amnesty argues that continued transfers risk contributing to serious violations of international law and has called for them to stop. The International Court of Justice is weighing whether Israel is responsible for genocide in Gaza.
India faces a strategic dilemma regardless of the court's eventual decision. New Delhi has traditionally maintained relationships across competing camps in the Middle East as part of its non-aligned foreign policy. It has close security ties with Israel while preserving key relations with Gulf states, Iran, and the Palestinians. The Middle East is central to India's energy security and trade, millions of Indians live and work in the Gulf, and India has major economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It also retains strategic interests in Iran's Chabahar Port and officially supports a two-state solution.
Deeper involvement in Israel's wartime supply chain makes that balancing act harder. The more India's industrial base becomes connected to Israel's war-geared defense economy, the harder it becomes to keep these relationships in separate diplomatic compartments. Strategic autonomy becomes harder to demonstrate when diplomatic balance coexists with material integration into one side's wartime supply chain.
More than an arms trade
Defense-industrial cooperation binds countries together differently than conventional arms purchases. Buying a missile or radar is largely transactional. Joint manufacturing, technology transfer, and integrated supply chains create deeper relationships involving factories, intellectual property, subcontractors, and long-term commercial interests.
For India, the partnership supports its ambition to expand indigenous defense production and reduce dependence on imported finished systems. For Israel, India offers manufacturing capacity, industrial scale, and one of the world's largest defense markets. These mutual interests make the relationship more resilient, but they also create exposure. Further escalation involving Gaza, Iran, or another regional theater could increase scrutiny of Indian companies and policymakers over where Indian-made military products ultimately go.
India should not, however, be mistaken for Israel's principal external supplier of major weapons. SIPRI estimates that the US accounted for 68% of Israel's major-arms imports in 2021–25, Germany 31%, and Italy 1.3%. This does not contradict Amnesty's findings; the two datasets measure different dimensions. SIPRI tracks major conventional weapons, while Amnesty's shipment-level investigation covers ammunition and components.
As India deepens its defense-industrial ties with Israel, it must navigate a region where alliances are shifting. The new defense pact among Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan signals a changing security landscape. India's own thaw with China is more about supply chains than strategic reset. In this environment, New Delhi's ability to balance its partnerships will be tested.
