Two months into the conflict with Iran, the rationale the United States offered for launching military action—and the minimum benchmarks Washington set for declaring success—have become increasingly incoherent. So much so that senior US officials now insist the war effectively ended in America's favor nearly a month ago, when a ceasefire took effect.
No statement better captures the disarray surrounding President Donald Trump's Iran policy than Secretary of State Marco Rubio's remarks on May 5. Rubio told reporters that the primary objective now was to restore the Strait of Hormuz to its pre-war state: open to all vessels, free of mines, and without tolls. He framed this as a purely defensive and humanitarian mission, claiming it would only escalate into war if US ships came under fire—which they did that same day. Rubio conveniently ignored the contradiction that the humanitarian operation was necessitated by the very war he was simultaneously presenting as already won.
Later that day, the situation took an even more absurd turn. Trump announced the suspension of "Project Freedom," his plan for the US Navy to escort tankers out of the strait, after just one day. The president cited "great progress" toward an agreement with Iran. Global stock markets briefly rallied before retreating, a pattern that has repeated itself several times.
A Desperate Search for an Exit
Few doubt that Trump is eager to extricate himself from this disastrous war, particularly ahead of his scheduled May 14 summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing. That meeting, which will address Iran oil, Taiwan, and trade tensions, is a critical moment for the US president. But Trump massively oversold the impression of a breakthrough. Iran was merely considering a 14-point proposal for 30 days of negotiations aimed at finding a durable end to the war.
The more plausible reason Trump abandoned Project Freedom is that it was already clear the plan would not resolve the crisis. Most owners of the 1,500 ships currently stranded behind the strait were unwilling to risk passage even with a naval escort. Iran's response—attacking shipping and launching missiles at the United Arab Emirates—also threatened the ceasefire itself.
Washington's fundamental problem is that Tehran will likely insist talks can only begin, and the Strait of Hormuz reopen, if Trump agrees to end the economic blockade of Iranian maritime trade. That blockade is inflicting serious damage on Iran's economy. Iranian officials see ending it as logical reciprocity, but they also understand that time is running out before the strait's closure causes lasting structural damage to the global economy. This gives them enhanced leverage.
Even if negotiations begin, the same obstacle that prevented a deal before the war remains. Trump lacks the detailed, institutionalized policy apparatus of his predecessor, Barack Obama, whose 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran the current US president so desperately wants to outdo. Obama's deal took 20 months of intense wrangling to complete. Trump has neither the patience, technical expertise, nor direct diplomatic connections to replicate that.
New conditions created by the war have further complicated matters. The fragmentation of Iran's decision-making process and the empowerment of elites with an even higher tolerance for military and economic pressure have introduced uncertainty. Iran has also realized the increased leverage it gains from its ability to close a critical artery of the global economy.
The nuclear issue may ultimately be resolved through a fudge. Iran could agree to a moratorium on uranium enrichment while not yet agreeing to ship out or dilute its enriched uranium—though without ruling that out, in order to prolong negotiations. If slightly more moderate heads in Tehran prevail—and that remains a very big if—it would be an obvious concession. Iran's geographic advantages and ballistic missile capabilities have established a credible deterrent against future attack.
The question is whether anything short of total surrender on the nuclear issue is acceptable to Trump, and whether he can resist inevitable Israeli opposition to blurring this red line. If not, he has already threatened to resume bombing at a "much higher intensity" than before. Yet there are serious doubts about whether he has the stomach for this. And even if he does, it is difficult to see how any amount of US and Israeli bombing can force the Iranian regime to surrender.
Trump's shifting aims and desperate scramble for an exit underscore that this entire enterprise has been a colossal strategic failure. It will define his legacy, reshape the Middle East, and impose further misery on the Iranian people—the very opposite of what he has repeatedly said he wants to do. The war has shattered confidence among US regional allies that Washington can protect them. It has also alienated traditional US allies who were blamed and then punished for failing to solve a problem they neither created nor could resolve.
The US and Israeli attacks have further entrenched a brutal regime that will now be even harder to negotiate with, while completely marginalizing moderate voices inside Iran. If negotiations can prevail, the successes Trump and his advisers trumpet—the destruction of parts of Iran's military-industrial capacity and navy—are real. Though in the former case probably only temporary, and in the latter, demonstrably not critical for maintaining freedom of navigation. The only positive is that Trump's brief experiment with military adventurism, an aberration even within his own muddled political trajectory, may now be ending.
Read more: Trump-Xi Summit in Beijing to Tackle Iran Oil, Taiwan, and Trade Tensions and China's Dual Role in Iran Conflict: Economic Lifeline and Diplomatic Broker.
