Chinese President Xi Jinping's rare visit to North Korea on June 8, his first international trip this year, has reignited speculation about a potential third summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The visit comes weeks after Xi hosted Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing, a sequence that has prompted fresh analysis in Seoul about the feasibility of renewed U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
Recent conversations with senior South Korean officials and North Korea analysts suggest that the possibility of a Trump-Kim meeting, which seemed increasingly unlikely as Trump's second term progressed, is now being taken more seriously. Some sources even indicated that such a summit could occur before the U.S. midterm elections in November.
Seoul's Divided Camps on North Korea
The administration of South Korean President Lee Jae-myung is reportedly split into two broad factions regarding North Korea policy. The jaju (autonomy) camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and seeks greater independence from Washington. The dongmaeng (alliance) camp prioritizes the U.S.-South Korea alliance and is more skeptical of Pyongyang's intentions.
Both camps might support another Trump-Kim summit to advance their respective goals, but they interpret North Korea's eagerness for talks differently. The dongmaeng camp argues that Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program. They point to tensions with China and ongoing sanctions as factors that have further strengthened the North Korea-Russia partnership.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Pyongyang in April, Seoul-based interlocutors noted that the Kim regime was dissatisfied with China's reluctance to recognize North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state. From this perspective, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the elite or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. Instead, the regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow.
Why Trump and Kim Might Want to Meet
The jaju camp offers a contrasting view. They believe Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president who will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. If Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea. However, one well-informed source cautioned, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, “he won’t go.”
From this perspective, a summit can happen even without formal U.S. recognition of North Korea as a nuclear state. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea's nuclear status, and China may be ready to follow Trump's lead. The viability of such an outcome for Trump may depend on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran's nuclear program, that could open the door to a similar arrangement on the Korean Peninsula, with Trump and Kim claiming to have achieved “peace” and ended the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years.
Some in Seoul suggested that a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America. “Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.
The Economic Driver
An important driver of a summit, at least for Kim, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, according to Kim Byung-yeon, a North Korea economy expert at Seoul National University. The country is dealing with high inflation, low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime's “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”
From the jaju camp's view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality; he needs investment from China and the West. To that end, the United States and China would need to cooperate. This argument is contested by experts who see the regime driven mainly by its security buildup, survival needs, and lingering aims of forced unification.
The odd man out in this scenario is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. President Lee has far less leverage compared with his predecessors, and Seoul's influence over the trajectory of U.S.-North Korea relations appears limited. For more on the broader regional dynamics, see our analysis of Xi Jinping's Pyongyang Visit: Managing a Nuclear North Korea Aligned with Moscow and the implications of the US-China Summit on South Korea's Strategic Autonomy Push.
