This week in New York, diplomats from nearly every nation begin a four-week review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the world's most comprehensive nuclear arms agreement. The stakes are higher than at any point in recent memory, as the treaty's foundational bargain—that nuclear-armed states would eventually disarm in exchange for others forgoing the bomb—lies in tatters.
Russia, Israel, and the United States, all nuclear-armed powers, are conducting military campaigns against non-nuclear states. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, engaged in cross-border clashes last year that raised the specter of nuclear escalation. In February, the last remaining arms control pact limiting Russian and US nuclear arsenals expired with no replacement. Together, Moscow and Washington hold nearly 90 percent of the world's nuclear warheads.
All nine nuclear-armed states are pouring vast resources into modernizing their arsenals, developing more capable and dangerous weapons. The number of deployed warheads on high alert—ready to launch within minutes—is also rising. These trends have pushed the Doomsday Clock, which gauges the risk of existential catastrophe, closer to midnight than at any point since its creation in 1947.
The NPT's Broken Promise
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built on a simple trade: the five original nuclear powers—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—committed to ending the arms race and eliminating their arsenals. In return, non-nuclear states agreed not to acquire such weapons, with the added incentive of assistance in developing peaceful nuclear technology. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was tasked with verifying compliance among non-nuclear states.
Yet the treaty set no timelines, defined processes, or enforcement mechanisms for disarmament. When it was clear by 1995 that the nuclear powers had not fulfilled their side of the bargain, the treaty was extended indefinitely, removing a key source of pressure. Since then, only two of the five-year review conferences—in 2000 and 2010—have produced agreed outcome documents, and their commitments remain largely unimplemented.
“It may not put an end to the NPT itself but it may hollow out the NPT,” warned Do Hung Viet, the Vietnamese diplomat chairing this year's conference. “We may lose the credibility of the NPT itself.”
Two New Threats
Two recent developments are casting long shadows over the New York talks. The first is Russia's unprecedented weaponization of nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Russian forces have attacked and damaged nuclear power plants, interfered with their operation, terrorized staff, and used some sites as military bases—all while jeopardizing the power and water supplies critical for cooling reactors and spent fuel. These actions risk a radiological disaster that could spread far beyond Ukraine's borders. At the last review conference in 2022, no measures were adopted to protect nuclear facilities from attack.
The second major issue is the US-Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. Both Washington and Tel Aviv cited Iran's imminent acquisition of nuclear weapons as justification, despite US intelligence officials and the IAEA chief stating that Tehran was not on the verge of building a bomb. These “might-is-right” attacks raise profound questions for non-nuclear states: why comply with the NPT's stringent requirements when nuclear-armed powers can use illegal force against them at will?
For the Indo-Pacific region, these dynamics are especially acute. Iran Conflict Prompts Indo-Pacific Nations to Reassess Nuclear Energy and Security Postures as countries like South Korea and Japan debate whether to pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Meanwhile, India's INS Aridhaman Submarine Bolsters Credible Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent, and North Korea Advances Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent with New Destroyer Tests, further complicating the regional security landscape.
The accelerating arms race, combined with the erosion of treaty norms, leaves the NPT at a crossroads. Without a renewed commitment to binding disarmament, the treaty risks becoming a hollow shell—and the world moves closer to a nuclear catastrophe that no one wants but few are working to prevent.
